Congestion games with failures
DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2011.01.019zbMATH Open1245.91007OpenAlexW2005014657MaRDI QIDQ642974FDOQ642974
Authors: Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz 
Publication date: 27 October 2011
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2011.01.019
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algorithmsprice of anarchycongestion gamespure strategy Nash equilibriumresource failuressemi-strong Nash equilibrium
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
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- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
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- Algorithms, games, and the internet
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- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- Congestion games with failures
- Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
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- Taxed congestion games with failures
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (11)
- \(r\)-extreme signalling for congestion control
- Taxed congestion games with failures
- Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures
- Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes
- On congestion games with player-specific costs and resource failures
- Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures
- Pure Nash equilibria in a generalization of congestion games allowing resource failures
- Proof systems and transformation games
- Congestion games with failures
- Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources
- Uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with link failures
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