r-extreme signalling for congestion control

DOI10.1080/00207179.2016.1146968zbMATH Open1360.93009arXiv1404.2458OpenAlexW2252673298MaRDI QIDQ2979529FDOQ2979529

Authors: Jakub Mareček, Jia Yuan Yu, Robert N. Shorten 

Publication date: 25 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In many "smart city" applications, congestion arises in part due to the nature of signals received by individuals from a central authority. In the model of Marecek et al. [arXiv:1406.7639, Int. J. Control 88(10), 2015], each agent uses one out of multiple resources at each time instant. The per-use cost of a resource depends on the number of concurrent users. A central authority has up-to-date knowledge of the congestion across all resources and uses randomisation to provide a scalar or an interval for each resource at each time. In this paper, the interval to broadcast per resource is obtained by taking the minima and maxima of costs observed within a time window of length r, rather than by randomisation. We show that the resulting distribution of agents across resources also converges in distribution, under plausible assumptions about the evolution of the population over time.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2458

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zbMATH Keywords

iterated function systemscongestion controlsignallingroute guidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signal theory (characterization, reconstruction, filtering, etc.) (94A12) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Decentralized systems (93A14) Stability of control systems (93D99)

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Cited In (5)

• On unique ergodicity of coupled AIMD flows
• Signalling and obfuscation for congestion control
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the ergodic control of ensembles
• On the ergodic control of ensembles in the presence of non-linear filters

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