SOME REMARKS ON EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN MATRIX GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198913400240zbMath1287.91017MaRDI QIDQ5396041

A. J. Shaiju, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ESSsymmetric gamePareto efficientmultiple mutationspure and mixed strategiesglobally strictly efficient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games

Cites Work

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• Bimatrix games have quasi-strict equilibria
• Game theory and evolution
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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