Weakly rational expectations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.10.001zbMATH Open1298.91046OpenAlexW2095026292MaRDI QIDQ393281FDOQ393281

Authors: Ziv Hellman 

Publication date: 16 January 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.001

Recommendations

• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: a framework for robust predictions
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
• Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
• Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
• On the narrow epistemology of game-theoretic agents

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectationsepistemic game theoryaction-consistent beliefscorrelated equilibra

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Common priors and separation of convex sets
• How common are common priors?

Cited In (1)

• An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium

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