Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105614MaRDI QIDQ2685873zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dilip Mookherjee, Masatoshi Tsumagari

Publication date 23 February 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powercollusionextortionmechanism designsupervision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
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Cites work

• Collusion and delegation under information control
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Consulting collusive experts
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• On von Neumann's minimax theorem
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations

Cited in

(6)

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Strategic sharing in regulatory regimes.
• Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
• Strategic analysis of influence peddling
• Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection
• Ex-ante regulation, ex-post regulation, and collusion

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