Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2685873
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614OpenAlexW4318269786MaRDI QIDQ2685873
Masatoshi Tsumagari, Dilip Mookherjee
Publication date: 23 February 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614
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