Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614OpenAlexW4318269786MaRDI QIDQ2685873

Masatoshi Tsumagari, Dilip Mookherjee

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powermechanism designcollusionsupervisionextortion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Consulting collusive experts
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• On von Neumann's minimax theorem
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Collusion and delegation under information control