Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection

DOI10.1007/s00712-007-0292-0zbMath1134.91030OpenAlexW1984368456MaRDI QIDQ2481214

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 9 April 2008

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0292-0

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioncollusionvertical separationintermediate institutionregulatory reform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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