The political (in)stability of funded social security

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2021.104237MaRDI QIDQ2054828zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Oliwia Komada, Krzysztof Makarski, Joanna Tyrowicz, Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Publication date 3 December 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104237

zbMATH Keywords

welfaresocial securityfundingpay-as-you-gomajority voteasset capture

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Recommendations

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Cites work

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Cited in

(8)

• Social security reform and intertemporal smoothing
• Intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics
• The commitment value of funding pensions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2100350 (Why is no real title available?)
• In Defense of Pay-as-You-Go (Paygo) Financing of Social Security
• Pay-as-you-go or funded social security? A general equilibrium comparison
• Can social security be welfare improving when there is demographic uncertainty?
• STATUS QUO PROBLEM IN SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS

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