Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00066-9zbMath0938.91048MaRDI QIDQ1300418

Yves Sprumont, Lin Zhou

Publication date: 25 June 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatization; solidarity; convex preference relations; egalitarian equivalent rules; large societies; Pazner-Schmeidler rules; Walrasian rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

Related Items

Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory, Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information, Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good, Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules., Welfarism in economic domains., Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle, Fairness and well-being measurement, Two criteria for social decisions, Fair social orderings, On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing

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