Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0809-8zbMATH Open1314.91104OpenAlexW2111176100MaRDI QIDQ2340261FDOQ2340261

Authors: Sidartha Gordon 

Publication date: 16 April 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/4ccevsvsdm96qpv5fgamlf1p1p

Recommendations

• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
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• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesspopulation-monotonicityunanimitysolidarityreplacement-dominationattribute-based domainsgeneralized single-peaked domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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Cited In (11)

• Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences
• Unanimity and resource monotonicity
• Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules
• Convex preferences: an abstract approach
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• Generalized target functions on trees
• Quantiles in abstract convex structures
• The target location function on finite trees
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• Preferences in abstract convex structures

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