Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents

DOI10.1007/S40305-016-0117-3zbMATH Open1368.91119OpenAlexW2283051029MaRDI QIDQ2014050FDOQ2014050

Authors: Lan Xiao, Xiaozhi Zhang 

Publication date: 10 August 2017

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-016-0117-3

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zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofapproximation mechanisms design without moneyobnoxious facility gameweighted agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

Cites Work

• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Incentives in Teams
• Strategyproof approximation of the minimax on networks
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
• On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Obnoxious Facility Location on Graphs
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
• Characterizing mechanisms in obnoxious facility game
• A survey on approximation mechanism design without money for facility games

Cited In (2)

• Parameterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in the Obnoxious Facility Game
• Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line

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