A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without Money for Facility Games
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-08377-3_13zbMath1320.91054arXiv1503.07426OpenAlexW3102865466MaRDI QIDQ2942465
Publication date: 11 September 2015
Published in: Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.07426
social choicealgorithmic mechanism designobnoxious facilityapproximation mechanism designfacility game
Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Games involving graphs (91A43) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Incentive compatible regression learning
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
- Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities
- Characterizing Mechanisms in Obnoxious Facility Game
- Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
- An Algorithmic Approach to Network Location Problems. I: Thep-Centers
- An Algorithmic Approach to Network Location Problems. II: Thep-Medians
- Obnoxious Facility Location on Graphs
- Obnoxious Facility Game with a Bounded Service Range
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Algorithmic mechanism design