Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24873-3_6zbMath1233.90211OpenAlexW1918562889MaRDI QIDQ3095293

Nguyen Kim Thang, Fanny Pascual, Olivier Spanjaard, Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24873-3_6

zbMATH Keywords

facility location gamesapproximation guaranteestrategy-proof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Combinatorial games (91A46) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (10)

Mechanism design for one-facility location game with obnoxious effects on a line ⋮ Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances ⋮ Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions ⋮ A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without Money for Facility Games ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range ⋮ Facility location games with distinct desires ⋮ Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources ⋮ Facility location games with optional preference ⋮ Mechanism Design for One-Facility Location Game with Obnoxious Effects ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line

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