When does predation dominate collusion?

DOI10.3982/ECTA13121MaRDI QIDQ4612506zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Thomas Wiseman

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13121

zbMATH Keywords

bankruptcycollusiondynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?
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Cited in

(8)

• The chain-store paradox revisited
• What happens when predators do not completely consume their prey?
• Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one?
• Repeated games and price wars
• Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
• Folk theorem under bankruptcy
• Community enforcement with endogenous records

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