Excess Capacity and Collusion
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Cited in
(16)- Dynamic capacity choice in a Bertrand-Edgeworth framework
- Is capital a collusion device?
- Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
- Competition and collusion with fixed output
- Dynamic pricing of peak production
- Research of collusion, competition and the optimal control policy
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- Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
- Long-run strategic advertising and short-run Bertrand competition
- Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
- R{\&}D investments as prebargaining strategies
- Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look
- Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity
- Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule
- Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
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