Dynamic pricing of peak production
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Cites work
- A Mixed Complementarity Model of Hydrothermal Electricity Competition in the Western United States
- Dynamic Pricing and Learning in Electricity Markets
- Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
- Excess Capacity and Collusion
- Modeling Implicit Collusion Using Coevolution
- Nash-Cournot Equilibria in Electric Power Markets with Piecewise Linear Demand Functions and Joint Constraints
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
- Risk in Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing
- Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
- Spatial Oligopolistic Electricity Models with Cournot Generators and Regulated Transmission Prices
- The theory and practice of revenue management
- Using Supply Functions for Offering Generation into an Electricity Market
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