Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints

DOI10.2307/2297659MaRDI QIDQ5187029zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William A. Brock, José A. Scheinkman

Publication date 1985

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/292587/files/uwmad-0007.PDF

zbMATH Keywords

cartel pricecollusionindustry capacityprice setting supergamesrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
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Cited in

(12)

• Repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs
• The repeated lake game.
• Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games
• Is capital a collusion device?
• A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames
• Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Price setting supergame with different costs
• The existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in a price-setting oligopoly with convex costs
• Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
• Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule
• Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets

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