Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
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Cites work
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1266748 (Why is no real title available?)
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- On duality theory of convex semi-infinite programming
- Semi-Infinite Programming: Theory, Methods, and Applications
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
Cited in
(5)- Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming
- A polynomial optimization approach to principal-agent problems
- Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
- Bonus or flat wage? An experiment into the principal-agent problem
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