Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems

DOI10.3982/ECTA6688MaRDI QIDQ3627282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John R. Conlon

Publication date 18 May 2009

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6688

zbMATH Keywords

agent modelfirst-order approachmoral hazardmultiple signalsprincipal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Utility theory (91B16)

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(32)

• Bidding for incentive contracts
• A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
• An envelope approach to tournament design
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
• Generic property of the partial calmness condition for bilevel programming problems
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
• Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• A dual approach to agency problems
• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Existence of \(\alpha\)-robust weak Nash equilibria for leader-follower population games with fuzzy parameters
• A general method for the existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• Player strength and effort in contests
• Agency theory and higher-order risk changes
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems

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