On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.08.001zbMath1284.91307MaRDI QIDQ2434228

Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approach; moral hazard; principal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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