Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems

DOI10.1007/s00199-001-0250-yzbMath1030.91018OpenAlexW2057897207MaRDI QIDQ1865172

Sandrine Spaeter, Marco Li Calzi

Publication date: 25 March 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/22577

zbMATH Keywords

Principal-agent problemConvexity in effortFirst-order approachMonotone likelihood ratio

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

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