Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1782287
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014zbMath1396.91358MaRDI QIDQ1782287
Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne
Publication date: 20 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014
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