Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.05.014zbMATH Open1396.91358OpenAlexW3121952793MaRDI QIDQ1782287FDOQ1782287

Authors: Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne 

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014

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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionprudenceprincipal-agent modelexecutive compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Exploring higher order risk effects
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Standard Risk Aversion
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model
• Environmental auditing in management systems and public policy

Cited In (3)

• Full downside risk aversion
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
• Common shocks and relative compensation

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