Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.05.014MaRDI QIDQ1782287zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne

Publication date 20 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionprudenceprincipal-agent modelexecutive compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
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Cites work

• Environmental auditing in management systems and public policy
• Exploring higher order risk effects
• Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• Standard Risk Aversion
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model

Cited in

(3)

• Common shocks and relative compensation
• Full downside risk aversion
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences

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