Efficient contract enforcement
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2636853
Recommendations
- Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
- Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions
- Does trade foster contract enforcement?
- Contract enforcement and productive efficiency: evidence from the bidding and renegotiation of power contracts in India
Cites work
- A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development
- Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy
- Does trade foster contract enforcement?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3798532 (Why is no real title available?)
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation
Cited in
(10)- Contract-intensive money: Contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance
- Preordered service in contract enforcement
- The effects of credit subsidies on development
- Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes
- Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking
- Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions
- Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment
- Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
- Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt
- Contract enforcement and productive efficiency: evidence from the bidding and renegotiation of power contracts in India
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