Does trade foster contract enforcement?

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0378-0zbMATH Open1177.91091OpenAlexW2159968818MaRDI QIDQ834719FDOQ834719

Authors: James E. Anderson 

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14045.pdf

Recommendations

• Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment
• Whither Formal Contracts?
• Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
• Institutional Quality and International Trade
• Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy

zbMATH Keywords

tradeliberalizationendogeneous institutionsimperfect contract enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Game theory (91A99) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (13)

• Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency?
• Trade and expropriation
• Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment
• Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions
• Legal Origins
• Institutional Quality and International Trade
• Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy
• Efficient policy in a predatory economy: to him who hath shall be given?
• Efficient contract enforcement
• Contract enforcement and productive efficiency: evidence from the bidding and renegotiation of power contracts in India
• Trade disputes and settlement
• Whither Formal Contracts?
• Contracting in the presence of judicial agency

This page was built for publication: Does trade foster contract enforcement?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q834719)