Does trade foster contract enforcement?

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0378-0MaRDI QIDQ834719zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James E. Anderson

Publication date 27 August 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w14045.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

tradeliberalizationendogeneous institutionsimperfect contract enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Game theory (91A99) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment
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Cited in

(13)

• Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency?
• Trade and expropriation
• Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions
• Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment
• Legal Origins
• Institutional Quality and International Trade
• Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy
• Efficient policy in a predatory economy: to him who hath shall be given?
• Efficient contract enforcement
• Trade disputes and settlement
• Contract enforcement and productive efficiency: evidence from the bidding and renegotiation of power contracts in India
• Whither Formal Contracts?
• Contracting in the presence of judicial agency

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