Legal environment and contractual choice

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0098MaRDI QIDQ2690359zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ho Cheung Cheng

Publication date 16 March 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0098

zbMATH Keywords

2 sided moral hazardcontractimperfect courttiming of payment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Contracting in the presence of judicial agency
• The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement
• Whither Formal Contracts?
• A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement

Cites work

• Courts
• Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
• Foundations for contest success functions
• The theory of contests: a survey

Cited in

(4)

• Up-front payment under RD rule
• The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement
• Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment
• Contracting in the presence of judicial agency

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