Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
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Publication:1342676
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90005-1zbMath0815.90008OpenAlexW1986638228MaRDI QIDQ1342676
Publication date: 27 June 1995
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90005-1
Related Items (2)
Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence ⋮ Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
Cites Work
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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