Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence

DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(97)82989-2MaRDI QIDQ1362490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georges Dionne, Robert Gagné, F. Gagnon, Charles Vanasse

Publication date 12 August 1997

Published in Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4076(97)82989-2

zbMATH Keywords

count datamoral hazarddebtairline accidentsairline safety

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
• A count data model with unobserved heterogeneity
• A new approach for modeling economic count data
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm
• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
• Overdispersion tests for truncated Poisson regression models
• Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Applications to Poisson Models
• Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Theory

Cited in

(3)

• Experience Rating Schemes for Fleets of Vehicles
• Modelling and estimating individual and firm effects with count panel data
• Estimating demand systems when outcomes are correlated counts

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