Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence

DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(97)82989-2zbMATH Open0900.62647OpenAlexW2788469885MaRDI QIDQ1362490FDOQ1362490

Authors: Georges Dionne, Robert Gagné, F. Gagnon, Charles Vanasse 

Publication date: 12 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4076(97)82989-2

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zbMATH Keywords

count datamoral hazarddebtairline accidentsairline safety

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Cites Work

• Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Theory
• A new approach for modeling economic count data
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Applications to Poisson Models
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Overdispersion tests for truncated Poisson regression models
• A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
• A count data model with unobserved heterogeneity
• Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm
• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt

Cited In (3)

• Estimating demand systems when outcomes are correlated counts
• Modelling and estimating individual and firm effects with count panel data
• Experience Rating Schemes for Fleets of Vehicles

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