Security design and firm dynamics under long-term moral hazard

DOI10.1002/ASMB.2208zbMATH Open1420.91501OpenAlexW2530015276MaRDI QIDQ4620175FDOQ4620175

Authors: Alexandre Messa 

Publication date: 8 February 2019

Published in: Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/asmb.2208

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zbMATH Keywords

hedgingsecurity designfinancial contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cited In (3)

• Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
• Repeated moral hazard and mechanism selection between limited partnership and corporate system

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