Relational enforcement

DOI10.3982/TE5183MaRDI QIDQ6565784zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Peter Achim, Jan Knoepfle

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5183

zbMATH Keywords

costly inspectionsdynamic enforcementpersistencerelational contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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• Reputation for Quality
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
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• The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
• Time to Come Clean? Disclosure and Inspection Policies for Green Production

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