Communication, commitment, and growth

DOI10.21034/DP.74MaRDI QIDQ1207489zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Albert Marcet, Ramon Marimon

Publication date 1 April 1993

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.21034/DP.74

zbMATH Keywords

alternative financing opportunitiesincentive constraintsstochastic growth model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Stochastic systems in control theory (general) (93E03)

Recommendations

• CREDIT AND GROWTH UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• International borrowing without commitment and informational lags: choice under uncertainty
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

Cites work

• A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money
• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4051296 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Stochastic turnpike property and stationary equilibrium
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(23)

• Export promotion, learning by doing, and growth
• Dynamic programming solution of incentive constrained problems
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• Algorithms for solving dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints
• Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time
• Finance and economic growth in a dynamic game
• Investment and bilateral insurance
• On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
• On the recursive saddle point method
• LEARNING THE INFLATION TARGET
• CREDIT AND GROWTH UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT
• History's a curse: leapfrogging, growth breaks and growth reversals under international borrowing without commitment
• Dynamic financial constraints: distinguishing mechanism design from exogenously incomplete regimes
• International borrowing without commitment and informational lags: choice under uncertainty
• Public versus private risk sharing
• Social conflict and growth.
• Monotone contracts
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
• Large external debt and (slow) domestic growth
• Using capital mobility to enforce commitment
• A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
• Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy
• Endogenous market incompleteness with investment risks

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