Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints
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Publication:1994233
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Cites work
- Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
- Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies
Cited in
(10)- Optimal project selection when borrowing and lending rates differ
- Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
- A theory of progressive lending
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- On a class of loans with a systematic amortisation schedule
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Managing the risk of loan prepayments and the optimal structure of short term lending rates
- Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness
- The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs
- Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth
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