Optimal banking with delegated monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105904MaRDI QIDQ6664570zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Nemanja Antić, Tai-Wei Hu

Publication date 16 January 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2024.105904

zbMATH Keywords

banking regulationscostly state verificationdelegated monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Bailouts and financial fragility
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynamics
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks

Cited in

(1)

• The role of risky debt and safe assets in unregulated financial intermediaries with costly state verification

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