Asymmetric partnerships

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.083zbMATH Open1242.91081OpenAlexW4232098012MaRDI QIDQ433189FDOQ433189

Authors: Nicolás Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta 

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.083

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zbMATH Keywords

partnershipsefficient mechanism designownership structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Universal possibility and impossibility results
• The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object

Cited In (5)

• Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• Shuttle diplomacy

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