Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43754 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Corrigendum to ``Multilateral matching
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Hypergraphs with no special cycles
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- Multilateral matching
- Odd cycles and \(\Theta\)-cycles in hypergraphs
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Understanding preferences: ``demand types, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
Cited in
(8)- The stochastic incentive effect of venture capital in partnership systems with the asymmetric bistable Cobb-Douglas utility
- Dynamically stable corporate joint ventures
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Corrigendum to ``Multilateral matching
- Multilateral matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5666291 (Why is no real title available?)
- The property rights theory of production networks
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
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