Cooperation with network monitoring
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(17)- Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks
- Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital
- The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge
- Stability in repeated matching markets
- Community enforcement and the cost of cooperation
- Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
- Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks
- Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents
- Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
- Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring
- Trust in cohesive communities
- Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks
- Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
- Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5000306 (Why is no real title available?)
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