Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment

DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1146-4zbMath1443.91087OpenAlexW2891733341WikidataQ129302459 ScholiaQ129302459MaRDI QIDQ2305045

Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jan Potters, Maria Bigoni

Publication date: 10 March 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11585/675791

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolyrepeated gamesflexibilityimperfect monitoringcartels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

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