Robust collusion with private information

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR035MaRDI QIDQ4610526zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David A. Miller

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr035

zbMATH Keywords

\textit{ex post} incentive compatibilitycollusionmechanism designprice warsprivate informationrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

Cited in

(11)

• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• A collusion problem and its solution
• Multi-product supply networks: implications of intermediaries
• Dynamic coordination via organizational routines
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Taking turns
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget

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