Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies
DOI10.1007/S10683-009-9228-6zbMATH Open1201.91024OpenAlexW2013609109MaRDI QIDQ2379697FDOQ2379697
Authors: Douglas D. Davis, Oleg Korenok, Robert J. Reilly 
Publication date: 19 March 2010
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9228-6
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Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Firm-specific cost savings and market power
- Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behaviour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games
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