Cooperation without coordination: signaling, types and tacit collusion in laboratory oligopolies

DOI10.1007/S10683-009-9228-6MaRDI QIDQ2379697zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Douglas D. Davis, Oleg Korenok, Robert J. Reilly

Publication date 19 March 2010

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9228-6

zbMATH Keywords

typesexperimentstacit collusionprice signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment
• Communication and market sharing: an experiment on the exchange of soft and hard information
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• A game-theoretical perspective for the detection of tacit collusion
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

Cites work

• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Firm-specific cost savings and market power
• Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behaviour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games

Cited in

(1)

• Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

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