Agency Models With Frequent Actions

DOI10.3982/ECTA10656MaRDI QIDQ4614258zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomasz Sadzik, Ennio Stacchetti

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10656

zbMATH Keywords

frequent actionsimperfect monitoringprincipal-agent modelquadratic approximation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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(8)

• Dynamic principal agent model based on CMDP
• A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
• Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
• Myopic agency
• Optimal Length of Labor Contracts
• What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model?
• Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
• Nonrecursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach

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