On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01753442zbMATH Open0249.90077MaRDI QIDQ2556798FDOQ2556798

Authors: Shmuel Zamir 

Publication date: 1972

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides

Cited In (12)

• Cyber-attack forecast modeling and complexity reduction using a game-theoretic framework
• Repeated games with incomplete information
• On repeated games with incomplete information played by non-Bayesian players
• On repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information and asymptotically bounded values
• How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?
• ``Eventually revealing repeated games with incomplete information
• Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states
• Optimal strategies for the uninformed player
• The maximal variation of martingales of probabilities and repeated games with incomplete information
• The normal distribution and repeated games
• On repeated games with general information function
• A note on the value of zero-sum sequential repeated games with incomplete information

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