Selling two complementary goods

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00879-8MaRDI QIDQ6581882zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa

Publication date 1 August 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-023-00879-8

zbMATH Keywords

complementary goodsmulti-dimensional private informationoptimal mechanismposted-price mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Haggling over substitutes
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• Selling two identical objects
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

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