A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs*
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- Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty
- Social preference under twofold uncertainty
- Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements
- Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating
- Heterogeneity and learning with complete markets
- Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences
- Media trading groups and short selling manipulation
- On efficiency in disagreement economies
- Preference aggregation with heterogeneous beliefs and catastrophe risk
- Optimal investment and equilibrium pricing under ambiguity
- Cautiousness when experts disagree
- Robust voting under uncertainty
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