Cautiousness when experts disagree
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- A dual approach to ambiguity aversion
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs*
- Additive representations on rank-ordered sets. II: The topological approach
- Aggregation of experts' opinions and conditional consensus opinion by the Steiner point
- Aggregation of multiple prior opinions
- Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
- Ambiguity made precise: A comparative foundation
- Attitude toward imprecise information
- Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism
- Combining Expert Judgments: A Bayesian Approach
- Combining probability distributions: A critique and an annotated bibliography
- Comonotonicity axioms and rank-dependent expected utility theory for arbitrary consequences
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: The economics of the precautionary principle
- Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information
- Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
- Expected utility without utility
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- Making decisions under model misspecification
- Marginalization and Linear Opinion Pools
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- No-betting-Pareto dominance
- Objective and subjective rationality in a multiple prior model
- Optimal Linear Opinion Pools
- Portfolio choices and asset prices: the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion
- Precautionary saving and the notion of ambiguity prudence
- Rational preferences under ambiguity
- Revisiting precautionary saving under ambiguity
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs
- Scale-invariant uncertainty-averse preferences and source-dependent constant relative risk aversion
- Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts
- Temporal resolution of uncertainty and recursive models of ambiguity aversion
- The ex ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- The Opinion Pool
- The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
- Uncertainty aversion with second-order utilities and probabilities
- Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors
- Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes Toward Variation
This page was built for publication: Cautiousness when experts disagree
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7286803)