Slow persuasion

DOI10.3982/TE5175MaRDI QIDQ6053650zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander

Publication date 23 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.09055

zbMATH Keywords

constraineddynamicgradualinformationpersuasionviscosity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Abstract: What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel 'viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.

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Cited in

(11)

• Slow consistency
• Resisting persuasion
• Waiting to Persuade
• The dark side of transparency: when hiding in plain sight works
• Markovian persuasion with two states
• The Dynamics of Instability
• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
• Contracting over persistent information
• \textit{Starting rough}, dynamic persuasion with partial information
• Continuous-time persuasion by filtering
• Ratings design and barriers to entry

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