Waiting to Persuade
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Recommendations
Cited in
(22)- Bargaining and delay: The role of external information
- No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
- Resisting persuasion
- Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
- Bargaining in small dynamic markets
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
- Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
- Wait-freedom with advice
- Wait-freedom with advice
- Slow persuasion
- Collective hold‐up
- Games with possibly naive present-biased players
- Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
- An optimistic search equilibrium
- Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?
- Optimal stalling when bargaining
- Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
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