Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00426MaRDI QIDQ5472969zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date 19 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00426

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(18)

• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Equity bargaining with common value
• Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem
• A theory of perceived discrimination
• Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
• Pledge-and-review bargaining
• Bargaining with optimism: identification and estimation of a model of medical malpractice litigation
• Optimism and bargaining inefficiency
• Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Efficiency and Immediate Agreement: A Reply to Hart and Levy
• Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
• Bargaining over a common categorisation
• On a variational sequential bargaining pricing scheme
• Ideological screening with content provision
• An optimistic search equilibrium
• Optimal stalling when bargaining
• Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
• Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games

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