Private disclosure with multiple agents
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Recommendations
- Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- Perfect robust implementation by private information design
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
Cites work
- A commitment folk theorem
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*
- Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
- Differential Privacy
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- How to share a secret
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Secure message transmission on directed networks
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- The economics of data externalities
- Theory of Cryptography
Cited in
(5)
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