Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1433MaRDI QIDQ3398231zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Derek J. Clark, Jean-Christophe Pereau

Publication date 26 September 2009

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1433

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cited in

(1)

• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations

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