The power of verification for one-parameter agents

DOI10.1016/J.JCSS.2008.10.001MaRDI QIDQ1004286zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Roberto De Prisco

Publication date 2 March 2009

Published in Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2008.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic game theorymechanism designtheory of algorithms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Nonnumerical algorithms (68W05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Automata, Languages and Programming
• New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
• Verifiably truthful mechanisms
• Approximation and Online Algorithms

Cites work

• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Approximation algorithms for metric facility location and k -Median problems using the primal-dual schema and Lagrangian relaxation
• Implementation with partial verification
• Optimal Auction Design
• Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
• STACS 2005
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(17)

• Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
• Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
• Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances
• Optimal on-line allocation rules with verification
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Truthfulness flooded domains and the power of verification for mechanism design
• Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
• The Subset Sum game
• Verifiably truthful mechanisms
• New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
• The power of verification for greedy mechanism design
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
• On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case

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