The power of verification for one-parameter agents
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1004286
Recommendations
Cites work
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Algorithms – ESA 2005
- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Approximation algorithms for metric facility location and k -Median problems using the primal-dual schema and Lagrangian relaxation
- Implementation with partial verification
- Optimal Auction Design
- Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
- STACS 2005
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(17)- On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
- The power of verification for greedy mechanism design
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Verifiably truthful mechanisms
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
- Truthfulness flooded domains and the power of verification for mechanism design
- Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
- Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
- New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Optimal on-line allocation rules with verification
- Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances
- The Subset Sum game
This page was built for publication: The power of verification for one-parameter agents
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1004286)