Truthfulness for the sum of weighted completion times
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Publication:2817845
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_2zbMATH Open1476.68305OpenAlexW2502785933MaRDI QIDQ2817845FDOQ2817845
Authors: Fanny Pascual, Nicolas Thibault, Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis
Publication date: 2 September 2016
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_2
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Cites Work
- Worst-case equilibria
- Incentives in Teams
- Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Scheduling Unrelated Machines by Randomized Rounding
- STACS 2005
- Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- Worst Case Bound of an LRF Schedule for the Mean Weighted Flow-Time Problem
- Scheduling Selfish Tasks: About the Performance of Truthful Algorithms
- Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- The Price of Anarchy for Minsum Related Machine Scheduling
- Scheduling tasks from selfish multi-tasks agents
- Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Multi-job Scheduling Games
Cited In (6)
- Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers
- Scheduling Selfish Tasks: About the Performance of Truthful Algorithms
- Truthful many-to-many assignment with private weights
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
- Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
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