Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
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Cites work
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Algorithms – ESA 2005
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Bounds on Multiprocessing Timing Anomalies
- Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
- Incentives in Teams
- STACS 2004
- STACS 2005
- Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Cited in
(24)- A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss
- Scheduling selfish jobs on multidimensional parallel machines
- Scheduling tasks from selfish multi-tasks agents
- Reducing price of anarchy of selfish task allocation with more selfishness
- Strategic scheduling games: equilibria and efficiency
- Asynchronous congestion games
- Coordination mechanisms
- Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
- Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks in Competitive Real-Time Environments
- Non-clairvoyant scheduling games
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- The price of multi-organization constraint in unrelated parallel machine scheduling
- Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines
- Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling
- Two agent scheduling with a central selection mechanism
- Competitive multi-agent scheduling with an iterative selection rule
- Preemptive Scheduling on Selfish Machines
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
- Truthfulness for the sum of weighted completion times
- Scheduling Selfish Tasks: About the Performance of Truthful Algorithms
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
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